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quart, from a period of "repressive" order, through a "legislative" 
order phase, into a new "bureaucratic" order era. During these 
stages the relationship between state authorities and the federal dis-
trict court changed from minimal contact, to adversarial contact, to 
less adversarial contact, a trend that has also appeared in other 
states. According to the authors, the most important reason for the 
current, more congenial relationship, "is that prisons have simply 
gotten better at operating constitutionally." Administrators in 
prison systems not directly effected by federal court actions have 
learned to learn from the experience of their peers. In 1987 Judge 
Justice commended Texas legislators, the governor, and Depart-
ment of Corrections administrators for the progress they had made 
in meeting the conditions of his order. 
An Appeal to Justice is a very well written, well documented 
account of an historic event in American legal and penal history; 
one which tested the proposition that the requirements of constitu-
tional law can be balanced with the maintenance of order in a peni-
tentiary system. 
IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A 
STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE. By Joseph R. 
Grodin.' Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA.: University of Cali-
fornia Press. 1989. Pp. xxi, 208. $20.00. 
Mark S. Pulliam 2 
Professor Joseph R. Grodin's breezy account of his odyssey 
from practicing lawyer (and protege of Matthew Tobriner) to law 
professor to California Court of Appeal justice, to California 
Supreme Court justice and back to law professor, is notable, first of 
all, for what it is not. It is not a philippic against the electoral tide 
that carried him, Chief Justice Rose Bird, and Associate Justice 
Cruz Reynoso off the California Supreme Court in 1986. Nor is it a 
calculatedly provocative statement of judicial philosophy in the vein 
of Justice Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court.3 
Nor is it an in-depth analysis of the decisions and internal politics of 
the court on which he served.4 Rather, it is a thoughtful and bal-
1. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; former 
Associate Justice, California Supreme Court. 
2. Member, California Bar. 
3. R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA (1981). 
4. Professor Preble Stolz wrote such an account of the Bird Court, prior to Grodin's 
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anced judicial memoir in which Professor Grodin reflects broadly 
on the law and its meaning with an emphasis on the proper role of 
judges. The book segues from autobiographical sketches to the his-
tory of the California Supreme Court to the origins of the California 
Constitution, the development of the common law, the evolution of 
legal theory, the concept of judicial review, and ultimately to the 
proper role ofthe judiciary in a democratic society. Given the rela-
tive brevity of the book and the number and breadth of the topics it 
covers, the treatment of each topic is necessarily superficial. This is 
not intended as a criticism; indeed, the book is styled as the author's 
"reflections" and Professor Grodin states in the Introduction that 
he writes for "the intelligent reader who is not a lawyer." He suc-
ceeds in distilling sometimes arcane subjects into readable prose, 
sprinkled with interesting anecdotes. 
The intersection of the author's diverse thoughts is in the last 
full chapter, titled "Elections," where he considers whether appel-
late judges should be subject to the will of the polity in the form of 
popular retention elections. One finishes the first nine chapters and 
heads into the finale wondering how an informed electorate could 
have voted such a compassionate, erudite, and moderate jurist out 
of office.s This "mood," which of course makes the rhetoric of 
chapter ten more effective, is a tribute to the subtlety and grace with 
which Professor Grodin presents his account of the demise of the 
Bird Court. He warns the reader early on that his "dual status as 
participant and observer, particularly as regards the 1986 election, 
may well color [his] outlook," and that the reader should make the 
"necessary discount for bias," but given the obliqueness of his fac-
tual account only readers intimately familiar with the record of the 
Bird Court and Grodin's role in it will be able to evaluate its 
accuracy.6 
arrival, in JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT (1981). 
5. See Stolz, Book Review, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1461, 1464 (1990) ("Justice Grodin's 
book is calm, balanced, and always careful to be fair, which at times can be a little cloy-
ing. . . . [I]n this book he is so determinedly dispassionate, oozing, as it were, judiciousness in 
every sentence .... "); Barnett, Book Review, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 247, 247-48 (1990) 
("Grodin's tone throughout is high-minded, scholarly, detached, his spirit generous and free 
of rancor .... Grodin, however, carries his restraint too far. He is sometimes too dignified, 
reticent, and disengaged."). 
6. Grodin discusses his record in the death penalty cases-a key issue in the 1986 
election-at some length, but only indirectly, in chapters dealing with "Criminal Cases," 
"Courts and the Initiative Process," and "State Constitutions." This confluence of seemingly 
unrelated topics is emphasized by former Justice William Brennan's Foreword, which en-
dorses state courts' use of state constitutions to develop "independent state grounds" to pro-
tect the rights of individuals against political majorities. The Bird Court was notorious for its 
. reliance on "independent state grounds" to invalidate death penalty verdicts in the face of 
overwhelming popular support for the death penalty (manifested in part by the passage in 
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As Grodin describes it, he was the victim of a retention elec-
tion process that threatens the integrity of the judiciary; he was op-
posed by "right wing" groups ostensibly concerned with the Court's 
criminal law and death penalty decisions, but which received finan-
cial support from farmers, "oil and gas interests, insurance inter-
ests, and real estate interests"; and he was associated in the public's 
mind with Chief Justice Rose Bird, who had narrowly averted de-
feat in 1978 in the face of unwarranted opposition that may have 
been motivated in part by sexism. Having to campaign, engage in 
political fund-raising, produce thirty-second television spots defend-
ing his "voting record," and to participate in an unstructured public 
referendum that "tends to degenerate into slogans" is, in Grodin's 
view, destructive of the independence of the judiciary. He proposes 
several alternatives, including the federal model of lifetime appoint-
ments for state court judges. 
Most of us, regardless of political persuasion, would agree that 
the judicial function should not be so politicized that it becomes just 
another branch of government; to this extent, we can all share 
Grodin's concern about the "darker side to a judicial election." But 
judicial autonomy, historically as well as logically, has been a corol-
lary of judicial restraint: if the role of judges basically is to apply 
law, then the case for their independence is strong, notwithstanding 
some interstitial lawmaking. If, however, judges are not severely 
constrained by law, the case for judicial independence becomes 
much weaker. It is no answer to say that judges have always "made 
law"; they have been allowed to do so only because most people 
don't care about such things as the exceptions to the statute of 
frauds. It is quite a different matter for judges to decide where our 
children go to school, and whether murderers may ever be exe-
cuted. Surely democratic principles require some constraints on the 
power of the judiciary. 1 
Let us consider the problem in perspective. The ouster of sit-
ting California Supreme Court justices had not occurred prior to 
1982 of Proposition 8, the Victim's Bill of Rights, which sought to eliminate the use of "in-
dependent state grounds" in search and seizure cases). E.g., People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136 
(1984). Grodin makes clear his personal abhorrence for the death penalty, but insists that 
"[f]rom what I know of myself, however-and I concede that there are limits to what one 
may know of oneself-I did not set about to search for ways of overturning death penalty 
convictions any more than I did with respect to other convictions." This is hardly the re-
sounding denial one would expect given the centrality of the death penalty as an issue in his 
defeat. 
7. Grodin concedes that "judicial elections can serve a useful purpose in maintaining 
public confidence in the judiciary." Later, however, he argues that the benefits of judicial 
elections do not justify the potential politicization of the judiciary and the concomitant dimi-
nution of judicial independence. 
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1986, even though the retention election mechanism was instituted 
way back in 1934, and was thus available during the heyday of 
Roger Traynor and Matthew Tobriner. The 1986 election, then, 
was an isolated phenomenon. As such, it should be judged on its 
individual merits, rather than by worrying about the hypothetical 
specter of abuse by future voters. What if the voters were right in 
1986? What if the Bird Court had been guilty of ignoring the statu-
tory and constitutional law its members were sworn to uphold? 
Wouldn't lifetime appointment have made a temporary problem 
permanent? Grodin's argument against electoral accountability 
begs the question whether the Bird Court was acting legitimately. 
His election defeat is lamentable only if he should not have been 
defeated. Otherwise, the system worked. Quite frankly, the pros-
pect of a Bird Court with life tenure sends shivers down my spine.s 
The contrast of liberal activist Grodin's 1986 rejection by "law 
and order" voters stymied by the Bird Court's anti-death penalty 
decisions with Robert Bork's 1987 rejection by liberal interest 
groups is so rich in irony that one wonders why the book fails to 
explore the parallels. How can one explain the seemingly irrecon-
cilable phenomena of the unprecedented defeat of three sitting Cali-
fornia Supreme Court justices in the election of 1986, in a 
showdown heralded as "the next thing to a national referendum on 
the legitimacy of liberal judicial activism,"9 followed only a year 
later by the Senate's repudiation of the leading proponent of judicial 
restraint? What explains the different results? State versus federal 
forums? Direct popular vote versus filtered (Senate) vote? The 
existence of single issue politics (the death penalty in the case of the 
California judicial retention election; the right of "privacy" in the 
case of Bork's confirmation battle)? Or, are the results really that 
different? Are both situations indicative of a quest for moderation 
or maintenance of the status quo?w If so, what lessons do the two 
episodes teach in terms of political theory and judicial philosophy? 
To address these questions would have made a great book. Instead, 
8. "Any justice who lacks an understanding of the appropriate limits of judicial power 
is not responsible and ought to be removed." P. JOHNSON, THE COURT ON TRIAL: THE 
CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL ELECTION OF 1986 14 (1985). 
9. /d. at 2. 
10. Grodin comes close to making this point when he rejects the tenn "activist" as 
misleading. Defining "activism" as non·adherence to judicial precedent (as opposed to un-
derlying statutory or constitutional provisions), Grodin asserts that 
[t]he most misleading use of the activist label is to associate it with a particular 
political philosophy, liberal or conservative. Activism as such is value-neutral. Ad-
herence to precedent can produce consequences approved by liberals or conserva-
tives depending on what the precedent is .... The Warren court may have been 
activist, but the Rehnquist court is activist insofar as it has refused to follow that 
court's rulings (p. 160). 
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Grodin has produced a series of chapters-half devoted to personal 
reminiscences of his career and half to philosophical musings about 
the law-that lack the cohesiveness or vision of Bork's The Tempt-
ing of America. According to Bork, "in the larger war for control 
of the law, there are only two sides. Either the Constitution and 
statutes are law, which means that their principles are known and 
control judges, or they are malleable texts that judges may rewrite 
to see that particular groups or political causes win." 11 Which side 
is Professor Grodin on (or, more pertinently, which side was Justice 
Grodin on)? 
To answer this question one must look at the author's current 
views as well as his opinions as a judge. His current views are 
summarized in the chapter titled "Do Judges Make Law?" Draw-
ing on the common law tradition that allows state court judges to 
develop legal rules through application of existing precedents to 
ever-changing factual circumstances, Grodin favors an expansive 
role for appellate courts in the formulation of public policy. He 
justifies the courts' active role in the development of common law, 
particularly in the areas of tort and product liability,12 on a variety 
of grounds, some sound and others not. For instance, he suggests 
that courts are superior to legislatures in developing public policy 
because courts' "jurisdiction is invoked not by lobbyists but by liti-
gants in a specific lawsuit"; legislatures "are inclined to listen most 
carefully to the voices of politically powerful people and groups." 
This type of rhetoric, which appears throughout the book, displays 
an elitist contempt for democratic processes in favor of lawmaking 
by judges. (It is unlikely, however, that Grodin would defend Loch-
ner and its progeny on the ground that labor laws are produced by 
"politically powerful people and groups.") 
Grodin goes so far as to assert that judicial activism aids the 
democratic process because it can "provoke the legislature into dia-
logue . . . that is a healthy aspect of our system of separation of 
powers." This "dialogue" argument has, unfortunately, become 
one of the staples of constitutional jurisprudence. It is one of those 
vacuous theories that no one believes except when it leads to results 
that he favors. Has anyone ever tried to justify Dred Scott on the 
11. R. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 2 ( 1990). 
12. Grodin notes with apparent pride that his colleague and mentor Matthew Tobri-
ner-"one of the outstanding state court judges in the country" (p. 8}--wrote decisions while 
on the California Supreme Court such as Dillon v. Legg and Tarasoffv. Board of Regents (pp. 
8, 75). Other commentators view these precedents less favorably. See. e.g., P. HUBER, LIA-
BILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). These critics view such 
pro-plaintiff decisions as a redistribution of society's resources by judicial fiat rather than a 
model of the common law method. 
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ground that it produced a superb dialogue about slavery and the 
role of the Court? 
Although he is careful to distinguish between the development 
of "common law" and the interpretation of statutes and the Consti-
tution, Grodin's conception of the proper role of judges in the area 
of common law is illustrated by two of his own decisions. The com-
mon law, in practice if not in theory, often involves the interpreta-
tion of statutes. Justice Grodin was not hesitant to create new 
causes of action for wrongful discharge, even in the face of express 
statutory provisions evidencing the California Legislature's inten-
tion that there be no remedy or that there be an exclusive adminis-
trative remedy. While he was on the Court of Appeal, he wrote two 
seminal decisions, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. ,13 and Bentzel v. 
Singer Co. 14 Pugh's holding that employees can assert an implied 
contractual claim for termination without good cause contravened 
California Labor Code Section 2922, which states that an employ-
ment for no specific term is terminable "at the will of either party, 
on notice to the other." Bentzel was contrary to California Labor 
Code Section 6312, which prescribes (normally exclusive) adminis-
trative remedies for the type of retaliatory conduct the Court of Ap-
peal found was tortious. Grodin repeatedly refers to Pugh as an 
example of the common law at work, and describes Bentzel as "the 
most significant opinion I wrote while in Division Two." He ac-
knowledges that Pugh limited the statutory rule of at-will employ-
ment, but defends the decision because "the atmosphere of social 
expectations had changed." If this is the common law method at 
work, courts are free to ignore statutes. But of course if that were 
generally true, the common law method would not be sacrosanct 
and could not be used to bolster the case for constitutional activism. 
The judicial development of public policy extends outside of 
the common law, in the areas of statutory and constitutional inter-
pretation. In the context of statutory construction, writes Grodin, 
this occurs when a judge, "in resolving policy questions not ex-
pressly answered by the legislature, [is] expected to bring to bear the 
standards and values of the community rather than [his] own idio-
syncratic judgment."'s Even this loose limitation is "a matter of 
degree." Ultimately, courts and legislatures engage in a "dynamic" 
"dialogue": "when the legislature adopts a statute, it knows it will 
be subject to judicial interpretation." Even though Grodin con-
13. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311 (1981). 
14. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290 (1982). 
15. Robert Bork points out that this distinction is illusory. SeeR. BoRK, supra note II, 
at 8-9, 130, 221, 241-50. 
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cedes that the legislature "has the last word" in the "inevitable" 
lawmaking through interpretation that courts engage in, he charac-
terizes the judicial role as a "partnership" with the legislature. 
Thus, whereas the common law method permits judges to be legisla-
tors, in the area of statutory construction judges are merely co-
legislators. 
As Grodin notes, it is in the constitutional arena that the de-
bate over the role of the courts is most intense. He begins by deny-
ing that judges can reliably divine the "original intent" of the 
framers. He then goes further, to suggest that judges are not obli-
gated to apply the original intent, even if it can be ascertained, if 
that intent is inconsistent with "shared community values." 
Grodin's discussion deserves quotation at length: 
[I]f we adopt a theory of original intent that limits us to considering what the fram-
ers and adopters would have thought about a particular problem such as school 
prayer or segregated schools (assuming, of course, that we can know such a thing), 
we run the risk of becoming captives of an earlier age in a way that the framers and 
adopters may not have intended and in a way that would make decisions like Brown 
v. Board of Education extremely difficult. . . . My own view is that we should look 
to the attitudes and intentions of the framers and adopters as a guide to interpreta-
tion but that it is both naive and misleading to expect that we will find some author-
itative criterion that will eliminate the neceSsity for contemproary judgment. 
Indeed, the nght and the obligation to make contemporary judgments may be our 
most va/uabl~nd burdensome-constitutional legacy. (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from the context that the possessive plural pronoun "our" 
in the passage quoted above refers to the judges' right and obliga-
tion. How are these judgments to be made without being com-
pletely subjective? "The question is a familiar one-we have 
grappled with it in the contexts of common law and statutory adju-
dication." Here the "we" refers to the author and the reader, but 
the expansive judicial roles Grodin finds appropriate in the common 
law and for statutory construction now loom large. 
The scope of judicial discretion in constitutional interpretation 
is seemingly limitless. To quote Grodin again at length: 
I do think it is meaningful ... to speak ... of shared community values as some-
thing that judges should look to and be guided by, as signposts for constitutional 
adjudication. . . . I think we must acknowledge that much of constitutional adjudi-
cation ... is ultimately quite subjective, calling for the exercise of greater discretion 
on the part of the judge than is typical of statutory interpretation. Discretion is not 
unlimited, however; it is simply very broad. 
There is no doubt that in the exercise of such discretion judges cannot entirely 
escape their own background and experiences. (Emphasis added.) 
Grodin does not say so explicitly, but he intimates that a "percepti-
ble consensus" emerged during the Bork confirmation hearings con-
cerning "shared community values" on the subjects of the first 
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amendment (it should not be limited to political speech), the equal 
protection clause (it should not be limited to blacks or ethnic mi-
norities), and the constitutional right of "personal privacy" (it ex-
ists, "no matter how difficult that area may be to define"). 
Grodin does not explain what precisely established this "per-
ceptible consensus," or what it means. Nor does he explain why 
judicial elections and the initiative process are bad if the ultimate 
criterion of judicial decisionmaking is whether it is within the main-
stream of "popular thought." It is relatively clear that Professor 
Grodin feels that an appellate judge could interpret the Constitution 
consistently with the foregoing "shared community values" without 
exceeding the proper role of the judiciary. Presumably a judge 
would not need so public an airing of these issues as the Bork hear-
ings to reach a conclusion regarding the principles embodied in the 
Constitution. An internal "moral dialogue, based on reasoning 
from accepted value positions . . . is capable at times of producing 
consensus on moral vlaues." This "moral dialogue" ends up sound-
ing a lot like judges deciding what is "right" in constitutional cases 
based solely on their personal views. Grodin seems to acknowledge 
this as an inevitable feature of judging.16 "The polarities of finding 
law and making it ... are like the background and foreground of a 
single painting." 
Whether it is descriptive or prescriptive, Professor Grodin's 
book obliterates entirely the distinction between law and politics. 
In Grodin's view, as long as judges are reasonably deliberate and 
pay lip service to precedent, their decisions are legitimate (except 
evidently if their views, like those of Robert Bork, are "outside the 
mainstream" as determined by some unspecified "moral consen-
sus"). To Grodin, statutes and constitutions are malleable texts, 
not law. With all due respect, the voters in 1986 were justified in 
concluding that Justice Grodin's views (including his decisions) 
were not consistent with the law. When a judge accepts (or insists 
on) an active political role, how can he then complain of political 
accountability? A judge who makes his decisions by identifying 
"social expectations," making "contemporary judgments," and en-
gaging in moral dialogues to perceive a "moral-consensus" is kid-
ding himself if he thinks he is doing anything but imposing his 
personal predilections on society. If judicial decisions should be 
based on "shared values," didn't Grodin's electoral defeat prove 
16. Grodin relates an anecdote about an otherwise conservative justice who wrote a 
decision prohibiting the warrantless search of a person's garbage can because he had an aging 
mother whose garbage can contained empty wine bottles. Grodin endorses this "decisional 
process" (p. 159). 
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that he was a bad judge? Or don't the people of California know 
which values they share? 
In sum, Grodin's odyssey is a fascinating one, but he does not 
convince this reader that the voters were wrong. 
"RACIAL MATTERS": THE FBI'S SECRET FILE ON 
BLACK AMERICA, 1968-1972. By Kenneth O'Reilly.t 
New York: Free Press, 1989. Pp. vii, 456. Cloth, $24.95. 
Michael R. Belknap 2 
The 1988 movie "Mississippi Burning" depicted the FBI as a 
protector of blacks. Led by Gene Hackman, its agents streamed 
into Mississippi to do battle with bigots and the Klan. Although 
"Mississippi Burning" simply reiterated in a somewhat more fic-
tionalized form the heroic portrayal of the FBI's role in the fight for 
racial justice already presented by Don Whitehead in his 1970 book 
Attack on Terror3 and by the 1975 made-for-television movie of the 
same title, it became the target of vocal critics, such as Coretta Scott 
King, who complained that, among other things, the film grossly 
overstated both the FBI's commitment to the cause of civil rights 
and its contributions to the success of the civil rights movement.4 
Professor Kenneth O'Reilly's compelling account, Racial Matters, 
proves beyond question that the critics were correct. O'Reilly dem-
onstrates that, far from protecting the civil rights movement, for 
about a decade in the 1960s and early 1970s the FBI waged war on 
black America. He leaves in doubt only the motivation behind the 
Bureau's attack. 
Racial Matters is the sort of first-rate monograph O'Reilly's 
earlier writing on the subject would lead one to expects It is, to be 
1. Professor of History, University of Alaska, Anchorage. 
2. Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, and Visiting Professor of His-
tory, University of California, San Diego. 
3. D. WHITEHEAD, ATTACK ON TERROR (1970). 
4. See, Champlin, 'Burning' Issue: How Much to Alter Fact to Fuel Drama, L.A. 
Times, Jan. 24, 1989, VI, at I, cols. 4-5. 
5. In recent years O'Reilly has focused his critical gaze on the FBI's relations with 
black America, producing several important articles and papers on that topic. See, e.g., 
O'Reilly, The Roosevelt Administration and Black Amen·ca: Federal Surveillance Policy and 
Civil Rights During the New Deal and World War II Years, 48 PHYLON 12 (1987); The FBI 
and the Civil Rights Movement Dun"ng the Kennedy Years-From the Freedom Rides to Al-
bany, 54 J.S. HISI. 201 (1988) (hereinafter cited as O'Reilly, Kennedy Years); The FBI and 
the Politics of Riots, 1964-1968, 75 J. AM. HISI. 91 (1988)( (hereinafter cited as O'Reilly, 
Riots); The FBI and the NAACP, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Organiza-
tion of American Historians (Mar. 24, 1990). See Belknap, Above the Law and Beyond its 
